Outline for January 31, 2008

Reading: text, §23.2, 2.1–2.3, 3.1–3.2

Discussion Problem. You discover a security flaw in the operating system on your company's computer. The flaw enables any user to read any other user's files, regardless of their protection. You have several choices: you can keep quiet and hope no-one else discovers the flaw, or tell the company, or tell the system vendor, or announce it on the Internet.

- 1. Suppose an exploitation of the vulnerability could be prevented by proper system configuration. Which of the above courses of action would you take, and why?
- 2. If an exploitation of the vulnerability could be detected (but not prevented) by system administrators, how would this change your answer to the first question?
- 3. Now suppose no exploitation of the vulnerability can be detected or prevented. Would this change your answer, and if so, how?

Lecture Outline

- 1. Generalization
 - a. See if other programs, interfaces, or subjects/objects suffer from the same problem
 - b. See if this suggests a more generic type of flaw
- 2. Elimination
- 3. Examples
 - a. Burroughs system
 - b. Corporate site
- 4. Access Control Matrix
 - a. Subjects, objects, and rights
 - b. Primitive commands: create subject/object, enter right, delete right, destroy subject/object
 - c. Commands and conditions: create-file, various flavors of grant-right to show conditions and nested commands
 - d. Copy flag
 - a. Attenuation of privileges
- 5. HRU Result
 - a. Notion of leakage in terms of ACM
 - b. Determining security of a generic system with generic rights and mono-operational commands is decidable
 - c. Determining security of a generic system with generic rights is undecidable
 - d. Meaning: can't derive a generic algorithm; must look at (sets of) individual case