Access Control Matrix

ECS 153 Spring Quarter 2021

Module 7

Description



- Subjects $S = \{ s_1, \ldots, s_n \}$
- Objects $O = \{ o_1, \ldots, o_m \}$
- Rights $R = \{ r_1, \ldots, r_k \}$
- Entries $A[s_i, o_j] \subseteq R$
- $A[s_i, o_j] = \{ r_x, \ldots, r_y \}$ means subject s_i has rights $r_x, \ldots, r_y$ over object o_j

Example 1

- Processes *p*, *q*
- Files *f*, *g*
- Rights *r*, *w*, *x*, *a*, *o*

	f	*g*	*p*	*q*
p	*rwo*	*r*	*rwxo*	*w*
q	*a*	*ro*	*r*	*rwxo*

Example 2

- Host names *telegraph*, *nob*, *toadflax*
- Rights *own*, *ftp*, *nfs*, *mail*

	telegraph	*nob*	*toadflax*
telegraph	*own*	*ftp*	*ftp*
nob		*ftp, mail, nfs, own*	*ftp, nfs, mail*
toadflax		*ftp, mail*	*ftp, mail, nfs, own*

Example 3

- Procedures *inc_ctr*, *dec_ctr*, *manage*
- Variable *counter*
- Rights *+*, *–*, *call*

	counter	*inc_ctr*	*dec_ctr*	*manage*
inc_ctr	*+*			
dec_ctr	*–*			
manager		*call*	*call*	*call*

Boolean Expression Evaluation

- ACM controls access to database fields
  - Subjects have attributes
  - Verbs define type of access
  - Rules associated with objects, verb pair
- Subject attempts to access object
  - Rule for object, verb evaluated, grants or denies access

Example

- Subject annie
  - Attributes *role* (artist), *group* (creative)
- Verb paint
  - Default 0 (deny unless explicitly granted)
- Object picture
  - Rule:

    paint: ‘artist’ in subject.role and
    ‘creative’ in subject.groups and
    time.hour ≥ 0 and time.hour ≤ 4

ACM at 3AM and 10AM

At 3AM, time condition met
ACM is:



At 10AM, time condition not met
ACM is:



State Transitions

- Change the protection state of system
- $|-$ represents transition
  - $X_i \; |-_\tau \; X_{i+1}$: command τ moves system from state X_i to X_{i+1}
  - $X_i \; |-^* \; Y$: a sequence of commands moves system from state X_i to Y
- Commands often called *transformation procedures*

Primitive Operations

- **create subject** *s*; **create object** *o*
  - Creates new row, column in ACM; creates new column in ACM
- **destroy subject** *s*; **destroy object** *o*
  - Deletes row, column from ACM; deletes column from ACM
- **enter** *r* **into** *A*[*s*, *o*]
  - Adds *r* rights for subject *s* over object *o*
- **delete** *r* **from** *A*[*s*, *o*]
  - Removes *r* rights from subject *s* over object *o*

Create Subject

- Precondition: $s \notin S$
- Primitive command: **create subject** s
- Postconditions:
  - $S' = S \cup \{ s \}$, $O' = O \cup \{ s \}$
  - $(\forall y \in O')\ [A'[s, y] = \varnothing]$, $(\forall x \in S')\ [A'[x, s] = \varnothing]$
  - $(\forall x \in S)(\forall y \in O)\ [A'[x, y] = A[x, y]]$

Create Object

- Precondition: $o \notin O$
- Primitive command: **create object** o
- Postconditions:
  - $S' = S$, $O' = O \cup \{ o \}$
  - $(\forall x \in S')\ [A'[x, o] = \varnothing]$
  - $(\forall x \in S)(\forall y \in O)\ [A'[x, y] = A[x, y]]$

Add Right

- Precondition: $s \in S$, $o \in O$
- Primitive command: **enter** r **into** $A[s, o]$
- Postconditions:
  - $S' = S$, $O' = O$
  - $A'[s, o] = A[s, o] \cup \{ r \}$
  - $(\forall x \in S')(\forall y \in O' - \{ o \})\ [A'[x, y] = A[x, y]]$
  - $(\forall x \in S' - \{ s \})(\forall y \in O')\ [A'[x, y] = A[x, y]]$

Delete Right

- Precondition: $s \in S$, $o \in O$
- Primitive command: **delete** r **from** $A[s, o]$
- Postconditions:
  - $S' = S$, $O' = O$
  - $A'[s, o] = A[s, o] - \{ r \}$
  - $(\forall x \in S')(\forall y \in O' - \{ o \})\ [A'[x, y] = A[x, y]]$
  - $(\forall x \in S' - \{ s \})(\forall y \in O')\ [A'[x, y] = A[x, y]]$

Destroy Subject

- Precondition: $s \in S$
- Primitive command: **destroy subject** s
- Postconditions:
  - $S' = S - \{ s \}$, $O' = O - \{ s \}$
  - $(\forall y \in O')\ [A'[s, y] = \varnothing]$, $(\forall x \in S')\ [A'[x, s] = \varnothing]$
  - $(\forall x \in S')(\forall y \in O')\ [A'[x, y] = A[x, y]]$

Destroy Object

- Precondition: $o \in O$
- Primitive command: **destroy object** *o*
- Postconditions:
  - $S' = S, O' = O - \{ o \}$
  - $(\forall x \in S')\ [A'[x, o] = \varnothing]$
  - $(\forall x \in S')(\forall y \in O')\ [A'[x, y] = A[x, y]]$

Creating File

- Process *p* creates file *f* with *r* and *w* permission

```
command create•file(p, f)
    create object f;
    enter own into A[p, f];
    enter r into A[p, f];
    enter w into A[p, f];
end
```

Mono-Operational Commands

- Make process *p* the owner of file *g*

```
command make•owner(p, g)
    enter own into A[p, g];
end
```

- Mono-operational command
  - Single primitive operation in this command

Conditional Commands

- Let *p* give *q* *r* rights over *f*, if *p* owns *f*

```
command grant•read•file•1(p, f, q)
    if own in A[p, f]
    then
        enter r into A[q, f];
end
```

- Mono-conditional command
  - Single condition in this command

Multiple Conditions

- Let *p* give *q* *r* and *w* rights over *f*, if *p* owns *f* and *p* has *c* rights over *q*

```
command grant•read•file•2(p, f, q)
    if own in A[p, f] and c in A[p, q]
    then
        enter r into A[q, f];
        enter w into A[q, f];
end
```

Copy Flag and Right

- Allows possessor to give rights to another
- Often attached to a right (called a *flag*), so only applies to that right
  - *r* is read right that cannot be copied
  - *rc* is read right that can be copied
- Is copy flag copied when giving *r* rights?
  - Depends on model, instantiation of model

Own Right

- Usually allows possessor to change entries in ACM column
  - So owner of object can add, delete rights for others
  - May depend on what system allows
    - Can't give rights to specific (set of) users
    - Can't pass copy flag to specific (set of) users

Attenuation of Privilege

- Principle says you can't increase your rights, or give rights you do not possess
  - Restricts addition of rights within a system
  - Usually *ignored* for owner
    - Why? Owner gives herself rights, gives them to others, deletes her rights.

What Is "Secure"?

- Adding a generic right *r* where there was not one is "leaking"
  - In what follows, a right leaks if it was not present *initially*
  - Alternately: not present *in the previous state* (not discussed here)
- If a system *S*, beginning in initial state s_0, cannot leak right *r*, it is *safe with respect to the right r*
  - Otherwise it is called *unsafe with respect to the right r*

Safety Question and Basic Results

- Is there an algorithm for determining whether a protection system *S* with initial state s_0 is safe with respect to a generic right *r*?
  - Here, “safe” = “secure” for an abstract model
- Mono-operational systems: yes, there is such an algorithm
- General systems: no, there is no such algorithm
  - Proof: reduce the halting problem to the safety question
  - Proved by Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman; often called the HRU result
  - Says *nothing* about particular classes of systems; this is a generic result

Mono-Operational Commands

- Answer: *yes*
- Sketch of proof:

  Consider minimal sequence of commands c_1, …, c_k to leak the right.

  - Can omit **delete**, **destroy**
  - Can merge all **create**s into one

  Worst case: insert every right into every entry; with *s* subjects and *o* objects initially, and *n* rights, upper bound is $k \leq n(s+1)(o+1)$