

# Cryptography I

ECS 153 Spring Quarter 2021

Module 13

# Cryptosystem

- Quintuple  $(\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{C})$ 
  - $\mathcal{M}$  set of plaintexts
  - $\mathcal{K}$  set of keys
  - $\mathcal{C}$  set of ciphertexts
  - $\mathcal{E}$  set of encryption functions  $e: \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{K} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$
  - $\mathcal{D}$  set of decryption functions  $d: \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{K} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$

# Example

- Example: Cæsar cipher
  - $\mathcal{M} = \{ \text{sequences of letters} \}$
  - $\mathcal{K} = \{ i \mid i \text{ is an integer and } 0 \leq i \leq 25 \}$
  - $\mathcal{E} = \{ E_k \mid k \in \mathcal{K} \text{ and for all letters } m, E_k(m) = (m + k) \bmod 26 \}$
  - $\mathcal{D} = \{ D_k \mid k \in \mathcal{K} \text{ and for all letters } c, D_k(c) = (26 + c - k) \bmod 26 \}$
  - $C = \mathcal{M}$

# Attacks

- Opponent whose goal is to break cryptosystem is the *adversary*
  - Assume adversary knows algorithm used, but not key
- Three types of attacks:
  - *ciphertext only*: adversary has only ciphertext; goal is to find plaintext, possibly key
  - *known plaintext*: adversary has ciphertext, corresponding plaintext; goal is to find key
  - *chosen plaintext*: adversary may supply plaintexts and obtain corresponding ciphertext; goal is to find key

# Basis for Attacks

- Mathematical attacks
  - Based on analysis of underlying mathematics
- Statistical attacks
  - Make assumptions about the distribution of letters, pairs of letters (digrams), triplets of letters (trigrams), *etc.*
    - Called *models of the language*
  - Examine ciphertext, correlate properties with the assumptions.

# Symmetric Cryptography

- Sender, receiver share common key
  - Keys may be the same, or trivial to derive from one another
  - Sometimes called *secret key cryptography*
- Two basic types
  - Transposition ciphers
  - Substitution ciphers
  - Combinations are called *product ciphers*

# Transposition Cipher

- Rearrange letters in plaintext to produce ciphertext

- Example (Rail-Fence Cipher)

- Plaintext is HELLO WORLD

- Rearrange as

HLOOL

ELWRD

- Ciphertext is HLOOL ELWRD

# Attacking the Cipher

- Anagramming
  - If 1-gram frequencies match English frequencies, but other  $n$ -gram frequencies do not, probably transposition
  - Rearrange letters to form  $n$ -grams with highest frequencies



# Example

- Ciphertext: HLOOLELWRD
- Frequencies of 2-grams beginning with H
  - HE 0.0305
  - HO 0.0043
  - HL, HW, HR, HD  $< 0.0010$
- Frequencies of 2-grams ending in H
  - WH 0.0026
  - EH, LH, OH, RH, DH  $\leq 0.0002$
- Implies E follows H

# Example

- Arrange so the H and E are adjacent

HE

LL

OW

OR

LD

- Read across, then down, to get original plaintext

# Substitution Ciphers

- Change characters in plaintext to produce ciphertext
- Example (Caesar cipher)
  - Plaintext is HELLO WORLD
  - Change each letter to the third letter following it (X goes to A, Y to B, Z to C)
    - Key is 3, usually written as letter 'D'
  - Ciphertext is KHOOR ZRUOG

# Attacking the Cipher

- Exhaustive search
  - If the key space is small enough, try all possible keys until you find the right one
  - Caesar cipher has 26 possible keys
- Statistical analysis
  - Compare to 1-gram model of English

# Statistical Attack

- Compute frequency of each letter in ciphertext:

G	0.1	H	0.1	K	0.1	O	0.3
R	0.2	U	0.1	Z	0.1		

- Apply 1-gram model of English
  - Frequency of characters (1-grams) in English is on next slide

# Character Frequencies

a	0.07984	h	0.06384	n	0.06876	t	0.09058
b	0.01511	i	0.07000	o	0.07691	u	0.02844
c	0.02504	j	0.00131	p	0.01741	v	0.01056
d	0.04260	k	0.00741	q	0.00107	w	0.02304
e	0.12452	l	0.03961	r	0.05912	x	0.00159
f	0.02262	m	0.02629	s	0.06333	y	0.02028
g	0.02013					z	0.00057

# Statistical Analysis

- $f(c)$  frequency of character  $c$  in ciphertext
- $\varphi(i)$  correlation of frequency of letters in ciphertext with corresponding letters in English, assuming key is  $i$ 
  - $\varphi(i) = \sum_{0 \leq c \leq 25} f(c)p(c - i)$  so here,  
$$\varphi(i) = 0.1 p(6 - i) + 0.1 p(7 - i) + 0.1 p(10 - i) + 0.3 p(14 - i) + 0.2 p(17 - i) + 0.1 p(20 - i) + 0.1 p(25 - i)$$
  - $p(x)$  is frequency of character  $x$  in English

# Correlation: $\varphi(i)$ for $0 \leq i \leq 25$

$i$	$\varphi(i)$	$i$	$\varphi(i)$	$i$	$\varphi(i)$	$i$	$\varphi(i)$
0	0.0469	7	0.0461	13	0.0505	19	0.0312
1	0.0393	8	0.0194	14	0.0561	20	0.0287
2	0.0396	9	0.0286	15	0.0215	21	0.0526
3	0.0586	10	0.0631	16	0.0306	22	0.0398
4	0.0259	11	0.0280	17	0.0386	23	0.0338
5	0.0165	12	0.0318	18	0.0317	24	0.0320
6	0.0676					25	0.0443



# The Result

- Most probable keys, based on  $\varphi$ :
  - $i = 6$ ,  $\varphi(i) = 0.0676$ 
    - plaintext EBIIL TLOLA
  - $i = 10$ ,  $\varphi(i) = 0.0631$ 
    - plaintext AXEEH PHKEW
  - $i = 14$ ,  $\varphi(i) = 0.0561$ 
    - plaintext WTAAD LDGAS
  - $i = 3$ ,  $\varphi(i) = 0.0586$ 
    - plaintext HELLO WORLD
- Only English phrase is for  $i = 3$ 
  - That's the key (3 or 'D')

# Caesar's Problem

- Key is too short
  - Can be found by exhaustive search
  - Statistical frequencies not concealed well
    - They look too much like regular English letters
- So make it longer
  - Multiple letters in key
  - Idea is to smooth the statistical frequencies to make cryptanalysis harder

# Vigènere Cipher

- Like Caesar cipher, but use a phrase
  - So it's effectively multiple Caesar ciphers
- Example
  - Message A LIMERICK PACKS LAUGHS ANATOMICAL
  - Key BENCH
  - Encipher using Caesar cipher for each letter:

key	BENCHBENCHBENCHBENCHBENCHBENCH
plain	ALIMERICKPACKSLAUGHSANATOMICAL
cipher	BPVOLSMPMWBGXUSBYTJZBRNVVNMPCS

# Relevant Parts of Tableau

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>N</i>
<i>C</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>N</i>
<i>E</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>P</i>
<i>G</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>R</i>
<i>H</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>T</i>
<i>I</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>U</i>
<i>K</i>	<i>J</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>V</i>
<i>L</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>X</i>
<i>M</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>Y</i>
<i>N</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>Z</i>
<i>O</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>A</i>
<i>P</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>B</i>
<i>R</i>	<i>Q</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>C</i>
<i>S</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>E</i>
<i>T</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>Z</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>U</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>G</i>
	<i>V</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>Y</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>H</i>

- Tableau shown has relevant rows, columns only
  - Columns correspond to letters from the key
  - Rows correspond to letters from the message
- Example encipherments:
  - key B, letter R: follow B column down to R row (giving “S”)
  - Key H, letter L: follow H column down to L row (giving “S”)

# Useful Terms

- *period*: length of key
  - In earlier example, period is 3
- *tableau*: table used to encipher and decipher
  - Vigenere cipher has key letters on top, plaintext letters on the left
- *polyalphabetic*: the key has several different letters
  - Caesar cipher is monoalphabetic

# Attacking the Cipher

- Approach
  - Establish period; call it  $n$
  - Break message into  $n$  parts, each part being enciphered using the same key letter
  - Solve each part; you can leverage one part from another
- We will show each step

# The Target Cipher

- We want to break this cipher:

ADQYS MIUSB OXKKT MIBHK IZOOO EQOOG IFBAG KAUMF  
VVTAA CIDTW MOCIO EQOOG BMBFV ZGGWP CIEKQ HSNEW  
VECNE DLAAV RWKXS VNSVP HCEUT QOIOF MEGJS WTPCH  
AJMOC HIUIX

# Establish Period

- Kaskski: *repetitions in the ciphertext occur when characters of the key appear over the same characters in the plaintext*
- Example:

```
key      VIGVIGVIGVIGVIGV
plain    THEBOYHASTHEBALL
cipher   OPKWWECIYOPKWIRG
```

Note the key and plaintext line up over the repetitions (underlined). As distance between repetitions is 9, the period is a factor of 9 (that is, 1, 3, or 9)



# Repetitions in Example

Letters	Start	End	Gap Length	Gap Length Factors
OEQOOG	24	54	30	2, 3, 5
MOC	50	122	72	2, 2, 2, 3, 3

# Estimate of Period

- OEQOOG is probably not a coincidence
  - It's too long for that
  - Period may be 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 15, or 30
- MOC is also probably not a coincidence
  - Period may be 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, or 72
- Period of 2 or 3 is probably too short (but maybe not)
- Begin with period of 6

# Check on Period

- Index of coincidence is probability that two randomly chosen letters from ciphertext will be the same
- Tabulated for different periods:

1      0.0660

2      0.0520

3      0.0473

6      0.0427

# Compute IC for an Alphabet

- $IC = [n(n-1)]^{-1} \sum_{0 \leq i \leq 25} [F_i(F_i-1)]$ 
  - where  $n$  is length of ciphertext and  $F_i$  the number of times character  $i$  occurs in ciphertext
- For the given ciphertext,  $IC = 0.0433$ 
  - Indicates a key of length 5 or 6
  - A statistical measure, so it can be in error, but it agrees with the previous estimate (which was 6)

# Splitting Into Alphabets

alphabet 1: AIKHOIATTOBGEEERNEOSAI

alphabet 2: DUKKEFUAWEMGKWDWSUFWJU

alphabet 3: QSTIQBMAMQBWQVLKVTMTMI

alphabet 4: YBMZOAFCCOFPHEAXPQEPOX

alphabet 5: SOIOOGVICOVCSVASHOGCC

alphabet 6: MXBOGKVDIGZINNVVCIJHH

- ICs (#1, 0.0692; #2, 0.0779; #3, 0.0779; #4, 0.0562; #5, 0.1238; #6, 0.0429) indicate all alphabets have period 1, except #4 (between 1 and 2) and #6 (between 5 and 6); assume statistical variance

# Frequency Examination

#	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
1	3	1	0	0	4	0	1	1	3	0	1	0	0	1	3	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	1	0	0	2	2	2	1	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	4	0	0	0
3	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	1	4	0	0	0	4	0	1	3	0	2	1	0	0	0
4	2	1	1	0	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1
5	1	0	5	0	0	0	2	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	3	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
6	0	1	1	1	0	0	2	2	3	1	1	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	1
	H	M	M	M	H	M	M	H	H	M	M	M	M	H	H	M	L	H	H	H	M	L	L	L	L	L

The last row has general letter frequencies (H high, M medium, L low)

# Begin Decryption

- First matches characteristics of unshifted alphabet
- Third matches if I shifted to A
- Sixth matches if V shifted to A
- Substitute into ciphertext (bold are substitutions)

**ADIYS RIUKB OCKKL MIGHK AZOTO EIOOL IFTAG**  
**PAUEF VATAS CIITW EOCNO EIOOL BMTFV EGGOP**  
**CNEKI HSSEW NECSE DDAAA RWCXS ANSNP HHEUL**  
**QONOF EEGOS WLPCM AJEOC MIUAX**

# Look For Clues

- **AJE** in last line suggests “are”, meaning second alphabet maps A into S:

**ALIYS RICKB OCKSL MIGHS AZOTO MIOOL INTAG**  
**PACEF VATIS CIITE EOCNO MIOOL BUTFV EGOOP**  
**CNESI HSSEE NECSE LDAAA RECXS ANANP HHECL**  
**QONON EEGOS ELPCM AREOC MICAX**



# Next Alphabet

- **MICAX** in last line suggests “mical” (a common ending for an adjective), meaning fourth alphabet maps O into A:

**ALIMS RICKP OCKSL AIGHS ANOTO MICOL INTOG**  
**PACET VATIS QIITE ECCNO MICOL BUTTV EGOOD**  
**CNESI VSSEE NSCSE LDOAA RECLS ANAND HHECL**  
**EONON ESGOS ELDCM ARECC MICAL**

# Got It!

- **QI** means that **U** maps into **I**, as **Q** is always followed by **U**:

**ALIME RICKP ACKSL AUGHS ANATO MICAL INTOS**  
**PACET HATIS QUITE ECONO MICAL BUTTH EGOOD**  
**ONESI VESEE NSOSE LDOMA RECLE ANAND THECL**  
**EANON ESSOS ELDOM ARECO MICAL**

# One-Time Pad

- A Vigenère cipher with a random key at least as long as the message
  - Provably unbreakable
  - Why? Look at ciphertext DXQR. Equally likely to correspond to plaintext DOIT (key AJIY) and to plaintext DONT (key AJDY) and any other 4 letters
  - Warning: keys *must* be random, or you can attack the cipher by trying to regenerate the key
    - Approximations, such as using pseudorandom number generators to generate keys, are *not* random

# Overview of the DES

- A block cipher:
  - encrypts blocks of 64 bits using a 64 bit key
  - outputs 64 bits of ciphertext
- A product cipher
  - basic unit is the bit
  - performs both substitution and transposition (permutation) on the bits
- Cipher consists of 16 rounds (iterations) each with a 48 bit round key generated from the user-supplied key

# Structure of the DES

- Input is first permuted, then split into left half (L) and right half (R), each 32 bits
- Round begins; R and round key run through function  $f$ , then xor'ed with L
  - $f$  expands R to 48 bits, xors with round key, and then each 6 bits of this are run through S-boxes (substitution boxes), each of which gives 4 bits of output
  - Those 32 bits are permuted and this is the output of  $f$
- R and L swapped, ending the round
  - Swapping does not occur in the last round
- After last round, L and R combined, permuted, forming DES output

# Controversy

- Considered too weak
  - Diffie, Hellman said in a few years technology would allow DES to be broken in days
    - Design using 1999 technology published
- Design decisions not public
  - S-boxes may have backdoors

# Undesirable Properties

- 4 weak keys
  - They are their own inverses
- 12 semi-weak keys
  - Each has another semi-weak key as inverse
- Complementation property
  - $DES_k(m) = c \Rightarrow DES_k(\bar{m}) = \bar{c}$
- S-boxes exhibit irregular properties
  - Distribution of odd, even numbers non-random
  - Outputs of fourth box depends on input to third box

# Differential Cryptanalysis

- A chosen ciphertext attack
  - Requires  $2^{47}$  plaintext, ciphertext pairs
- Revealed several properties
  - Small changes in S-boxes reduced the number of pairs needed
  - Making every bit of the round keys independent did not impede attack
- Linear cryptanalysis improves result
  - Requires  $2^{43}$  plaintext, ciphertext pairs



# DES Modes

- Electronic Code Book Mode (ECB)
  - Encipher each block independently
- Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)
  - Xor each block with previous ciphertext block
  - Requires an initialization vector for the first one
- Encrypt-Decrypt-Encrypt (2 keys:  $k, k'$ )
  - $c = \text{DES}_k(\text{DES}_{k'}^{-1}(\text{DES}_k(m)))$
- Triple DES(3 keys:  $k, k', k''$ )
  - $c = \text{DES}_k(\text{DES}_{k'}(\text{DES}_{k''}(m)))$

# Current Status of DES

- Design for computer system, associated software that could break any DES-enciphered message in a few days published in 1998
- Several challenges to break DES messages solved using distributed computing
- NIST selected Rijndael as Advanced Encryption Standard, successor to DES
  - Designed to withstand attacks that were successful on DES
- DES officially withdrawn in 2005

# Advanced Encryption Standard

- Competition announces in 1997 to select successor to DES
  - Successor needed to be available for use without payment (no royalties, etc.)
  - Successor must encipher 128-bit blocks with keys of lengths 128, 192, and 256
- 3 workshops in which proposed successors were presented, analyzed
- Rijndael selected as successor to DES, called the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
  - Other finalists were Twofish, Serpent, RC6, MARS

# Overview of the AES

- A block cipher:
  - encrypts blocks of 128 bits using a 128, 192, or 256 bit key
  - outputs 128 bits of ciphertext
- A product cipher
  - basic unit is the bit
  - performs both substitution and transposition (permutation) on the bits
- Cipher consists of rounds (iterations) each with a round key generated from the user-supplied key
  - If 128 bit key, then 10 rounds
  - If 192 bit key, then 12 rounds
  - If 256 bit key, then 14 rounds

# Structure of the AES: Encryption

- Input placed into a state array, which is then combined with zeroth round key
  - Treat state array as a 4x4 matrix, each entry being a byte
- Round begins; new values substituted for each byte of the state array
- Rows then cyclically shifted
- Each column independently altered
  - Not done in last round
- Result xor'ed with round key
- After last round, state array is the encrypted input

# Structure of the AES: Decryption

- Round key schedule reversed
- Input placed into a state array, which is then combined with zeroth round key (of reversed schedule)
- Round begins; rows cyclically shifted, then new values substituted for each byte of the state array
  - Inverse rotation, substitution of encryption
- Result xor'ed with round key (of reversed schedule)
- Each column independently altered
  - Inverse of encryption; this is not done in last round
- After last round, state array is the decrypted input

# Analysis of AES

- Designed to withstand attacks that the DES is vulnerable to
- All details of design made public, unlike with the DES
  - In particular, those of the substitutions (S-boxes) were described
- After 2 successive rounds, every bit in the state array depends on every bit in the state array 2 rounds ago
- No weak, semi-weak keys

# AES Modes

- DES modes also work with AES
- EDE and “Triple-AES” not used
  - Extended block size makes this unnecessary
- New counter mode CTR added