# Lecture 11 Outline

## Reading: text, §8

- 1. Role-based Access Control (RBAC)
  - a. Definition of role
  - b. Partitioning as job function
  - c. Containment
- 2. Problem with instantiation of Bell-LaPadula Model
  - a. Covert channel example: what is "writing"?
  - b. Composition of lattices
  - c. Principles of autonomy and security
- 3. Deterministic noninterference
  - a. Model of system
  - b. Example
  - c. Relationship of output to states
  - d. Projections and purge functions
- 4. Alternative definition of security policy
  - a. Output-consistent
  - b. Security policy
  - c. Alternate projection function
  - d. Noninterference-secure with respect to the policy r
- 5. Unwinding Theorem
  - a. Locally respects
  - b. Transition-consistent
  - c. Unwinding theorem
- 6. Access Control Matrix interpretation
  - a. Model
  - b. ACM conditions
  - c. Policy conditions
  - d. Result
- 7. Policies that change over time
  - a. Generalization of noninterference
  - b. Example
- 8. Composing deterministic, noninterference-secure systems

## **Table of Notation**

### notation

### meaning

- *C* set of commands (s, z), where *s* executes operation *z*
- $C^*$  set of sequences of commands
- $\pi''$  generalized noninterference analogue to the purge function  $\pi_{G,A}$
- v empty string
- $c_s$  sequence of commands
- $P(c, \sigma_i)$  output from command *c* being executed in state  $\sigma_i$
- $P^*(c_s, \sigma_i)$  outputs when command sequence  $c_s$  is executed in state  $\sigma_i$
- $proj(s, c_s, \sigma_i)$  set of outputs in  $P * (c_s, \sigma_i)$  that subject s is authorized to see
  - w sequence of elements of C leading up to current state
- cando(w, s, z) true if s can execute z in current state
  - pass(s,z) give s right to execute z
    - $w_n \quad v_1, \dots, v_n$  where  $v_i \in C^*$
  - $prev(w_n) = w_{n-1}$
  - $last(w_n) = v_n$ 
    - $\pi_L$  projection function deleting all *High* inputs from trace