

ECS 235B Module 51

Isolation

Isolation

- Constrain process execution in such a way it can only interact with other entities in a manner preserving isolation
 - Hardware isolation
 - Virtual machines
 - Library operating systems
 - Sandboxes
- Modify program or process so that its actions will preserve isolation
 - Program rewriting
 - Compiling
 - Loading

Hardware Isolation

- Ensure the hardware is disconnected from any other system
 - This includes networking, including wireless
- Example: SCADA systems
 - 1st generation: serial protocols, not connected to other systems or networks; no security defenses needed, focus being on malfunctions
 - 2nd generation: serial networks connected to computers not connected to Internet
 - 3rd generation: TCP/IP protocol running on networks connected to Internet; need security defenses for attackers coming in over Internet
- Example: electronic voting systems
 - Physical isolation protects systems from attackers changing votes remotely
 - Required in many U.S. states, such as California: never connect them to any network

Virtual Machine

- Program that simulates hardware of a machine
 - Machine may be an existing, physical one or an abstract one
 - Uses special operating system, called *virtual machine monitor (VMM)* or *hypervisor*, to provide environment simulating target machine
- Types of virtual machines
 - Type 1 hypervisor: runs directly on hardware
 - Type 2 hypervisor: runs on another operating system
- Existing OSes do not need to be modified
 - Run under VMM, which enforces security policy
 - Effectively, VMM is a security kernel

VMM as Security Kernel

- VMM deals with subjects (the VMs)
 - Knows nothing about the processes within the VM
- VMM applies security checks to subjects
 - By transitivity, these controls apply to processes on VMs
- Thus, satisfies rule of transitive confinement

Example 1: KVM/370

- KVM/370 is security-enhanced version of VM/370 VMM
 - Goal: prevent communications between VMs of different security classes
 - Like VM/370, provides VMs with minidisks, sharing some portions of those disks
 - Unlike VM/370, mediates access to shared areas to limit communication in accordance with security policy

Example 2: VAX/VMM

- Can run either VMS or Ultrix
- 4 privilege levels for VM system
 - VM user, VM supervisor, VM executive, VM kernel (both physical executive)
- VMM runs in physical kernel mode
 - Only it can access certain resources
- VMM subjects: users and VMs

Example 2

- VMM has flat file system for itself
 - Rest of disk partitioned among VMs
 - VMs can use any file system structure
 - Each VM has its own set of file systems
 - Subjects, objects have security, integrity classes
 - Called *access classes*
 - VMM has sophisticated auditing mechanism

Example 3: Xen Hypervisor

- Xen 3.0 hypervisor on Intel virtualization technology
- Two modes, VMX root and nonroot operation
- Hardware-based VMs (HVMs) are fully virtualized domains, support unmodified guest operating systems and run in non-root operation mode
 - Xen hypervisor runs in VMX root mode
- 8 levels of privilege
 - 4 in VMX root operation mode
 - 4 in VMX root operation mode
 - No need to virtualize one of the privilege levels!

Xen and Privileged Instructions

- Guest operating system executes privileged instruction
 - But this can only be done as a VMX root operation
- Control transfers to Xen hypervisor (called *VM exit*)
- Hypervisor determines whether to execute instruction
- After, it updates HVM appropriately and returns control to guest operating system (called *VM entry*)

Problem

- Physical resources shared
 - System CPU, disks, etc.
- May share logical resources
 - Depends on how system is implemented
- Allows covert channels

Container

- Unlike VM, all containers on a system share same kernel, execute instructions natively (no emulation)
- Each container contains libraries, applications needed to execute the program(s) contained in it
- Isolates contents from other containers

Example: Docker

- Widely used in Linux systems
- Container with all libraries, programs, other data for contained software
- Runs as a daemon that launches containers, monitors them, controls levels of isolation using Linux kernel features
 - Containers have own namespace, file system, reduced set of capabilities
 - Control network access; each container can have this set as appropriate, and each assigned its own IP address
 - *root* user of container differs from that of system

Alternate Approach

- VMs present a full system (hardware and operating system)
 - But process in the VM may be able to optimize use of system resources better than the VM
 - Example: VM operating system assumes disk drive, but it's really SSD
- Proposed: a kernel with only 2 functions:
 - Use hardware protections to prevent processes from accessing another's memory, or overwriting it
 - Manage access to shared physical resources
 - Everything else is done at user level

Library Operating System

- A library, or set of libraries, that provide operating system functionality at the user level
 - Goal is to minimize overhead of context switching and provide processes with as much flexibility as possible
- Example: V++ Cache Kernel
 - Cache kernel tracks OS objects such as address spaces, and handles process co-ordination (like scheduling) -- runs in privileged mode
 - Application kernel manages process resources such as paging, when on page fault it loads new page mapping descriptor into Cache Kernel – runs in user mode

Example: Drawbridge

- Library OS developed for Windows 7
 - Supports standard Windows applications (Excel, IIS), gives access to features like DirectX
- Security monitor provides application binary interface (ABI), virtualizing system resources
 - Processes use library OS to access ABI; all interactions with operating system go through that interface
 - ABI has calls to manage virtual memory, processes and threads, etc.
- Library OS provides application services like frameworks, graphics engines

Example: Drawbridge (con't)

- Kernel dependencies handled using Windows NT emulator at lowest level of library OS
 - Effect: all server dependencies, Windows subsystems moved into user space
- Human-computer interactions use emulated device drivers tunneling input, output between desktop and security monitor
- Provides process isolation
 - Experiment: run malware that deleted all registry keys
 - Under Drawbridge, only the process with the malware was affected
 - Without Drawbridge, all processes affected
 - Experiment: try attack vectors causing Internet Explorer to escape its normal protected mode (so writing to disk was unconstrained, for example)
 - Drawbridge kept Internet Explorer properly confined

Sandboxes

- An environment in which actions are restricted in accordance with security policy
 - Limit execution environment as needed
 - Program not modified
 - Libraries, kernel modified to restrict actions
 - Modify program to check, restrict actions
 - Like dynamic debuggers, profilers

Examples Limiting Environment

- Java virtual machine
 - Security manager limits access of downloaded programs as policy dictates
- Sidewinder firewall
 - Type enforcement limits access
 - Policy fixed in kernel by vendor
- Domain Type Enforcement
 - Enforcement mechanism for DTEL
 - Kernel enforces sandbox defined by system administrator

Modifying Programs

- Add breakpoints or special instructions to source, binary code
 - On trap or execution of special instructions, analyze state of process
- Variant: *software fault isolation*
 - Add instructions checking memory accesses, other security issues
 - Any attempt to violate policy causes trap

Example: Janus

- Implements sandbox in which system calls checked
 - *Framework* does runtime checking
 - *Modules* determine which accesses allowed
- Configuration file
 - Instructs loading of modules
 - Also lists constraints

Configuration File

```
# basic module
basic

# define subprocess environment variables
putenv IFS="\t\n " PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/bin TZ=PST8PDT

# deny access to everything except files under /usr
path deny read,write *
path allow read,write /usr/*
# allow subprocess to read files in library directories
# needed for dynamic loading
path allow read /lib/* /usr/lib/* /usr/local/lib/*
# needed so child can execute programs
path allow read,exec /sbin/* /bin/* /usr/bin/*
```

How It Works

- Framework builds list of relevant system calls
 - Then marks each with allowed, disallowed actions
- When monitored system call executed
 - Framework checks arguments, validates that call is allowed for those arguments
 - If not, returns failure
 - Otherwise, give control back to child, so normal system call proceeds

Use

- Reading MIME Mail: fear is user sets mail reader to display attachment using Postscript engine
 - Has mechanism to execute system-level commands
 - Embed a file deletion command in attachment ...
- Janus configured to disallow execution of any subcommands by Postscript engine
 - Above attempt fails

Example: Capsicum

- Framework developed to sandbox an application
- *Capability* provides fine-grained rights for accessing, manipulating underlying file
- To enter sandbox (*capability mode*), process issues *cap_enter*
- Given file descriptor, create capability with *cap_new*
 - Mask of rights indicates what rights are to be set; if capability exists, mask must be subset of rights in that capability
- At user level, library provides interface to start sandboxed process and delegate rights to it
 - All nondelegated file descriptors closed
 - Address space flushed
 - Socket returned to creator to enable it to communicate with new process

Example: Capsicum (con't)

- Global namespaces not available
 - So system calls that depend on that (like *open(2)*) don't work
 - Need to use a modified *open* that takes file descriptor for containing directory
 - Other system calls modified appropriately
 - System calls creating memory objects can create anonymous ones, not named ones (as those names are in global namespace)
- Subprocesses cannot escalate privileges
 - But a privileged process can enter capability mode
- All restrictions applied in kernel, not at system call interface

Program Confinement and TCB

- Confinement mechanisms part of trusted computing bases
 - On failure, less protection than security officers, users believe
 - “False sense of security”
- Must ensure confinement mechanism correctly implements desired security policy

Program Modification

- Source, binary code transformed to implement confinement constraints
- Can be done in several ways:
 - Code rewriter, used before compiling to alter source code
 - Compiler, transforming code as it compiles it
 - Binary code rewriter, used on the executable
 - Linking loader, used to transform linkages between program and library functions, system calls to validate interactions

Rewriting

- Software fault isolation: put untrusted modules in special virtual segments
 - Code modified so control flow remains in that segment when module invoked
 - All memory accesses in segment are to data in that segment

Implementation

- Each virtual segment has a unique *segment identifier* in upper part of virtual address
 - *Unsafe instruction* is one that accesses an address that cannot be verified to be in module's segment
- Segment matching: analyze program, identify all unsafe instructions and wrap them so they are checked at run time
 - If check shows address not in module, trap it
- Alternative: set upper bits of any virtual address to segment identifier
 - Illegal memory accesses handled in usual way

Implementation (con't)

- Threat: untrusted module issues system call to close file that trusted modules rely on
 - Causes program crash or other undesirable actions
- Trusted arbitration code places in its own segment
 - This accepts RPC requests from other modules, validates them, and translates them into system calls
 - Results returned via RPC
- Untrusted modules rewritten so system calls done vis the arbitration code (ie, using RPC to that module)

Rewriting

- Can put security-sensitive parts into separate trusted process
 - Application rewritten so untrusted parts invoke trusted parts via IPC
 - Both trusted, untrusted parts must be started to run application
- Example: Nizza architecture
 - Untrusted process executed on VM
 - AppCore, a trusted process, executed in trusted computing environment
 - Analyze application to identify security-sensitive components
 - Place these components into a standalone process (AppCore). May need to be altered to conform to security policy
 - Transform rest of process to use AppCore to execute security-sensitive components

Compiling

- Compiler implements a security policy so resulting executable provides desired isolation
 - Example: type-safe languages, in which compiler verifies use of types is consistent
- Certifying compiler includes proof that program satisfies specified security properties
 - Proof can be validated before execution

Transforming Compiler

- CCured imposes type safety on C programs by adding semantics to constructs that can produce undefined results
 - Safe pointer of type t points to the address of an object of type t , or 0 (NULL pointer)
 - Sequence pointer points into memory area of objects of type t ; so check is that it is a pointer of type t , points to object of type t in that memory area
 - Dynamic pointer can point to untyped areas of memory, or memory of arbitrary type (this is tagged with type of values currently in that area)
- Type inference algorithm used to construct CCured program honoring type rules

Certifying Compiler

- Touchstone works on type-safe subset of C
 - All array references are checked to ensure they are in bounds
- Compiler translates program into assembly
- VCGen generates verification conditions
 - Works on per-function basis using symbolic execution
 - Type specifications declare types of arguments (preconditions) and return values (postconditions)
 - Builds a predicate based on machine instructions
 - On a return instruction, emits a predicate that includes check on instantiation of preconditions, predicate built from assembly language, and a check on postconditions
 - Predicate can be proved iff program satisfies postcondition and registers preserved on entry are not changed
- Theorem prover verifies proof

Loading

- Like sandboxing, but framework embedded in libraries and not a separate process
- When called, a constrained library applies security policy rules to determine whether it should take desired action
- Example: Aurasium for Android apps
 - Goal: prevent exfiltration of sensitive data or misuse of resources
 - Adds code to monitor all interactions with phone's resources; these can be considerably more granular than default permissions set at installation

Aurasium

- Goal: prevent exfiltration of sensitive data or misuse of resources on Android phone by apps
 - Adds code to monitor all interactions with phone's resources; these can be considerably more granular than default permissions set at installation
- First part: tool that inserts code to enforce policies when app calls on phone resources, such as SMS messages
- Second part: use modified Android standard C libraries that determine whether app's requested system call should be blocked
- App signatures verified before Aurasium transforms app; then Aurasium signs app
 - Issue is that when Aurasium transforms app, original signature no longer valid