

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
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



- Protection state of system
 - Describes current settings, values of system relevant to protection
- Access control matrix
 - Describes protection state precisely
 - Matrix describing rights of subjects
 - State transitions change elements of matrix












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ACM of Database Queries

 $O_{i} = \{ \text{ objects referenced in query } i \}; \text{ let } |O| = n (3, \text{ here}) \\ f(o_{i}) = \{ \text{ read } \} & \text{for } o_{j} \in O_{i}, \text{ if } |\cup_{j = 1, \dots, i} O_{j}| \neq 2, n-1 \\ f(o_{i}) = \emptyset & \text{for } o_{j} \in O_{i}, \text{ otherwise} \\ 1. \quad O_{1} = \{ \text{ Alice, Dilbert, Eve } \}, \text{ so } |O_{1}| = n, \text{ and:} \\ A[\text{asker, Alice}] = f(\text{Alice}) = \{ \text{ read } \} \\ A[\text{asker, Dilbert}] = f(\text{Dilbert}) = \{ \text{ read } \} \\ A[\text{asker, Eve}] = f(\text{Eve}) = \{ \text{ read } \} \\ \text{and query can be answered} \end{cases}$

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But Query 2

From last slide:

 $\begin{array}{l} f(o_i) = \{ \text{ read } \} & \text{for } o_j \in O_i, \text{ if } | \cup_{j=1,...,i} O_j | \neq 2, n-1 \\ f(o_i) = \varnothing & \text{for } o_j \in O_i, \text{ otherwise} \\ \hline 2. & O_2 = \{ \text{ Alice, Dilbert } \} \text{ but } | O_1 \cup O_2 | = n-1, \text{ so} \\ A[\text{asker, Alice}] = f(\text{Alice}) = \varnothing \\ A[\text{asker, Dilbert}] = f(\text{Dilbert}) = \varnothing \\ \text{and query cannot be answered} \end{array}$

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
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State Transitions

- Change the protection state of system
- |- represents transition
 - $-X_i \mid -\tau X_{i+1}$: command τ moves system from state X_i to X_{i+1}
 - $-X_i \mid X_{i+1}$: a sequence of commands moves system from state X_i to X_{i+1}
- Commands often called *transformation* procedures


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Create Subject

- Precondition: $s \notin S$
- Primitive command: create subject s
- Postconditions:
 - $-S' = S \cup \{ s \}, O' = O \cup \{ s \}$
 - $(\forall y \in O')[a'[s, y] = \emptyset], (\forall x \in S')[a'[x, s] = \emptyset]$
 - $(\forall x \in S)(\forall y \in O)[a'[x, y] = a[x, y]]$



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Delete Right

- Precondition: $s \in S$, $o \in O$
- Primitive command: **delete** *r* **from** *a*[*s*,*o*]
- Postconditions:

$$-S' = S, O' = O$$

$$-a'[s, o] = a[s, o] - \{r\}$$


- $-(\forall x \in S')(\forall y \in O' \{o\}) [a'[x, y] = a[x, y]]$
- $-(\forall x \in S' \{ s \})(\forall y \in O') [a'[x, y] = a[x, y]]$


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
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Destroy Subject

- Precondition: $s \in S$
- Primitive command: destroy subject s
- Postconditions:
 - $-S' = S \{s\}, O' = O \{s\}$
 - $(\forall y \in O')[a'[s, y] = \emptyset], (\forall x \in S')[a'[x, s] = \emptyset]$
 - $(\forall x \in S')(\forall y \in O') [a'[x, y] = a[x, y]]$







Example: Invalid Command

```
command create file(p, q, r)
create object o;
if r in A[p, q] then
enter r into A[p, o];
```

end

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Example: Valid Command

```
command add•r•right(o, p, q, r)
    if r in A[p, q] then
        enter r into A[p, o];
end
command create•file(p, q, r)
        create object o;
        add•r•right(o, p, q, r);
end
```

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Copy Right


- Allows possessor to give rights to another
- Often attached to a right, so only applies to that right
 - *r* is read right that cannot be copied
 - rc is read right that can be copied
- Is copy flag copied when giving *r* rights?
 Depends on model, instantiation of model

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Own Right

- Usually allows possessor to change entries in ACM column
 - So owner of object can add, delete rights for others
 - May depend on what system allows
 - Can't give rights to specific (set of) users
 - Can't pass copy flag to specific (set of) users



- Access control matrix simplest abstraction mechanism for representing protection state
- Transitions alter protection state
- 6 primitive operations alter matrix
 - Transitions can be expressed as commands composed of these operations and, possibly, conditions

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