

ECS 289M Lecture 2

April 3, 2006

Overview

- Protection state of system
 - Describes current settings, values of system relevant to protection
- Access control matrix
 - Describes protection state precisely
 - Matrix describing rights of subjects
 - State transitions change elements of matrix

Description

objects (entities)

	o_1	...	o_m	s_1	...	s_n
s_1						
s_2						
...						
s_n						

subjects

- Subjects $S = \{s_1, \dots, s_n\}$
- Objects $O = \{o_1, \dots, o_m\}$
- Rights $R = \{r_1, \dots, r_k\}$
- Entries $A[s_i, o_j] \subseteq R$
- $A[s_i, o_j] = \{r_x, \dots, r_y\}$ means subject s_i has rights r_x, \dots, r_y over object o_j

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Example 1

- Processes p, q
- Files f, g
- Rights r, w, x, a, o

	f	g	p	q
p	rwo	r	$rwXO$	w
q	a	ro	r	$rwXO$

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Example 2

- Procedures *inc_ctr*, *dec_ctr*, *manage*
- Variable *counter*
- Rights +, −, *call*

	<i>counter</i>	<i>inc_ctr</i>	<i>dec_ctr</i>	<i>manage</i>
<i>inc_ctr</i>	+			
<i>dec_ctr</i>	−			
<i>manage</i>		<i>call</i>	<i>call</i>	<i>call</i>

Boolean Expression Evaluation

- ACM controls access to database fields
 - Subjects have attributes
 - Verbs define type of access
 - Rules associated with objects, verb pair
- Subject attempts to access object
 - Rule for object, verb evaluated, grants or denies access

Example

- Subject annie
 - Attributes role (artist), groups (creative)
- Verb paint
 - Default 0 (deny unless explicitly granted)
- Object picture
 - Rule:
paint: 'artist' in subject.role and
'creative' in subject.groups and
time.hour ≥ 0 and time.hour < 5

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ACM at 3AM and 10AM

At 3AM, time condition
met; ACM is:

... picture ...

...			
annie ...		paint	
...			

At 10AM, time condition
not met; ACM is:

... picture ...

...			
annie ...			
...			

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History

Database:

name	position	age	salary
Alice	teacher	45	\$40,000
Bob	aide	20	\$20,000
Cathy	principal	37	\$60,000
Dilbert	teacher	50	\$50,000
Eve	teacher	33	\$50,000

Queries:

1. $\text{sum}(\text{salary}, \text{"position = teacher"}) = \$140,000$
2. $\text{sum}(\text{salary}, \text{"age > 40 \& position = teacher"})$ should not be answered (deduce Eve's salary)

ACM of Database Queries

$O_i = \{ \text{objects referenced in query } i \}$; let $|O| = n$ (3, here)
 $f(o_j) = \{ \text{read} \}$ for $o_j \in O_i$, if $|\cup_{j=1, \dots, i} O_j| \neq 2, n-1$
 $f(o_j) = \emptyset$ for $o_j \in O_i$, otherwise

1. $O_1 = \{ \text{Alice, Dilbert, Eve} \}$, so $|O_1| = n$, and:
A[asker, Alice] = $f(\text{Alice}) = \{ \text{read} \}$
A[asker, Dilbert] = $f(\text{Dilbert}) = \{ \text{read} \}$
A[asker, Eve] = $f(\text{Eve}) = \{ \text{read} \}$
and query can be answered

But Query 2

From last slide:

$f(o_i) = \{ \text{read} \}$ for $o_i \in O_i$, if $|\cup_{j=1, \dots, i} O_j| \neq 2, n-1$

$f(o_i) = \emptyset$ for $o_i \in O_i$, otherwise

2. $O_2 = \{ \text{Alice, Dilbert} \}$ but $|O_1 \cup O_2| = n-1$, so

$A[\text{asker, Alice}] = f(\text{Alice}) = \emptyset$

$A[\text{asker, Dilbert}] = f(\text{Dilbert}) = \emptyset$

and query cannot be answered

State Transitions

- Change the protection state of system
- $|-$ represents transition
 - $X_i |-\tau X_{i+1}$: command τ moves system from state X_i to X_{i+1}
 - $X_i |-* X_{i+1}$: a sequence of commands moves system from state X_i to X_{i+1}
- Commands often called *transformation procedures*

Primitive Operations

- **create subject s ; create object o**
 - Creates new row, column in ACM; creates new column in ACM
- **destroy subject s ; destroy object o**
 - Deletes row, column from ACM; deletes column from ACM
- **enter r into $A[s, o]$**
 - Adds r rights for subject s over object o
- **delete r from $A[s, o]$**
 - Removes r rights from subject s over object o

Create Subject

- Precondition: $s \notin S$
- Primitive command: **create subject s**
- Postconditions:
 - $S' = S \cup \{s\}$, $O' = O \cup \{s\}$
 - $(\forall y \in O')[a'[s, y] = \emptyset]$, $(\forall x \in S')[a'[x, s] = \emptyset]$
 - $(\forall x \in S)(\forall y \in O)[a'[x, y] = a[x, y]]$

Create Object

- Precondition: $o \notin O$
- Primitive command: **create object o**
- Postconditions:
 - $S' = S, O' = O \cup \{o\}$
 - $(\forall x \in S')[a'[x, o] = \emptyset]$
 - $(\forall x \in S)(\forall y \in O)[a'[x, y] = a[x, y]]$

Add Right

- Precondition: $s \in S, o \in O$
- Primitive command: **enter r into $a[s, o]$**
- Postconditions:
 - $S' = S, O' = O$
 - $a'[s, o] = a[s, o] \cup \{r\}$
 - $(\forall x \in S')(\forall y \in O' - \{o\}) [a'[x, y] = a[x, y]]$
 - $(\forall x \in S' - \{s\})(\forall y \in O') [a'[x, y] = a[x, y]]$

Delete Right

- Precondition: $s \in S, o \in O$
- Primitive command: **delete r from $a[s,o]$**
- Postconditions:
 - $S' = S, O' = O$
 - $a'[s, o] = a[s, o] - \{ r \}$
 - $(\forall x \in S')(\forall y \in O' - \{ o \}) [a'[x, y] = a[x, y]]$
 - $(\forall x \in S' - \{ s \})(\forall y \in O') [a'[x, y] = a[x, y]]$

Destroy Subject

- Precondition: $s \in S$
- Primitive command: **destroy subject s**
- Postconditions:
 - $S' = S - \{ s \}, O' = O - \{ s \}$
 - $(\forall y \in O')[a'[s, y] = \emptyset], (\forall x \in S')[a'[x, s] = \emptyset]$
 - $(\forall x \in S')(\forall y \in O') [a'[x, y] = a[x, y]]$

Destroy Object

- Precondition: $o \in O$
- Primitive command: **destroy object o**
- Postconditions:
 - $S' = S, O' = O - \{o\}$
 - $(\forall x \in S')[a'[x, o] = \emptyset]$
 - $(\forall x \in S')(\forall y \in O') [a'[x, y] = a[x, y]]$

Creating File

- Process p creates file f with r and w permission

```
command create·file( $p, f$ )  
  create object  $f$ ;  
  enter own into  $A[p, f]$ ;  
  enter  $r$  into  $A[p, f]$ ;  
  enter  $w$  into  $A[p, f]$ ;  
end
```

Mono-Operational Commands

- Make process p the owner of file g
command *make.owner(p, g)*
 enter *own into A[p, g];*
end
- Mono-operational command
 - Single primitive operation in this command

Conditional Commands

- Let p give q r rights over f , if p owns f
command *grant.read.file.l(p, f, q)*
 if *own in A[p, f]*
 then
 enter *r into A[q, f];*
 end
- Mono-conditional command
 - Single condition in this command

Biconditional Commands

- Let p give q r and w rights over f , if p owns f and p has c rights over q

```
command grant.read.file.2( $p, f, q$ )  
  if own in  $A[p, f]$  and  $c$  in  $A[p, q]$   
  then  
    enter  $r$  into  $A[q, f];$   
    enter  $w$  into  $A[q, f];$   
end
```

General Form of Commands

- Conditional part
 - At most one “if” allowed
 - “If” must be first thing in command
 - Only “and”s allowed in “if” statement
 - If condition(s) in “if” are false, body of command *not* executed
- Body
 - May contain commands and/or primitive operations
 - May *not* contain “if”s (embed them in called commands)

Example: Invalid Command

```
command create•file(p, q, r)  
  create object o;  
  if r in  $A[p, q]$  then  
    enter r into  $A[p, o]$ ;  
end
```

Example: Valid Command

```
command add•r•right(o, p, q, r)  
  if r in  $A[p, q]$  then  
    enter r into  $A[p, o]$ ;  
end  
command create•file(p, q, r)  
  create object o;  
  add•r•right(o, p, q, r);  
end
```

Copy Right

- Allows possessor to give rights to another
- Often attached to a right, so only applies to that right
 - r is read right that cannot be copied
 - rc is read right that can be copied
- Is copy flag copied when giving r rights?
 - Depends on model, instantiation of model

Own Right

- Usually allows possessor to change entries in ACM column
 - So owner of object can add, delete rights for others
 - May depend on what system allows
 - Can't give rights to specific (set of) users
 - Can't pass copy flag to specific (set of) users

Attenuation of Privilege

- Principle says you can't give rights you do not possess
 - Restricts addition of rights within a system
 - Usually *ignored* for owner
 - Why? Owner gives herself rights, gives them to others, deletes her rights.

Key Points

- Access control matrix simplest abstraction mechanism for representing protection state
- Transitions alter protection state
- 6 primitive operations alter matrix
 - Transitions can be expressed as commands composed of these operations and, possibly, conditions