ECS 289M Lecture 6

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Safety Result

• If the scheme is acyclic and attenuating, the safety question is decidable

Expressive Power


- How do the sets of systems that models can describe compare?
 - If HRU equivalent to SPM, SPM provides more specific answer to safety question
 - If HRU describes more systems, SPM applies only to the systems it can describe


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HRU vs. SPM

- SPM more abstract
 - Analyses focus on limits of model, not details of representation
- HRU allows revocation
 - SPM has no equivalent to delete, destroy
- HRU allows multiparent creates
 - SPM cannot express multiparent creates easily, and not at all if the parents are of different types because *can*•*create* allows for only one type of creator







2-Parent Joint Create Suffices


- Goal: emulate 3-parent joint create with 2-parent joint create
- Definition of 3-parent joint create (subjects P₁, P₂, P₃; child C):
 - $-cc(\tau(\mathbf{P}_1), \tau(\mathbf{P}_2), \tau(\mathbf{P}_3)) = Z \subseteq T$
 - $cr_{P1}(\tau(P_1), \tau(P_2), \tau(P_3)) = C/R_{1,1} \cup P_1/R_{2,1}$
 - $cr_{P2}(\tau(P_1), \tau(P_2), \tau(P_3)) = C/R_{2.1} \cup P_2/R_{2.2}$
 - $cr_{P3}(\tau(P_1), \tau(P_2), \tau(P_3)) = C/R_{3,1} \cup P_3/R_{2,3}$

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- Following added to create rule:
 - $cr_P(p_1, a_1) = \emptyset$
 - $cr_{c}(p_{1}, a_{1}) = p_{1}/Rtc$
 - Agent's parent set to creating parent; agent has all rights over parent
 - $cr_{Pfirst}(p_2, a_1, a_2) = \emptyset$
 - $cr_{Psecond}(p_2, a_1, a_2) = \emptyset$
 - $cr_{c}(p_{2}, a_{1}, a_{2}) = p_{2}/Rtc \cup a_{1}/tc$
 - Agent's parent set to creating parent and agent; agent has all rights over parent (but not over agent)



Link Predicates

- Idea: no tickets to parents until child created
 - Done by requiring each agent to have its own parent rights
 - $link_1(\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_2) = \mathbf{A}_1/t \in dom(\mathbf{A}_2) \land \mathbf{A}_2/t \in dom(\mathbf{A}_2)$
 - $link_1(\mathbf{A}_2, \mathbf{A}_3) = \mathbf{A}_2/t \in dom(\mathbf{A}_3) \land \mathbf{A}_3/t \in dom(\mathbf{A}_3)$
 - $link_2(\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{A}_3) = \mathbf{A}_3/t \in dom(\mathbf{S}) \land \mathbf{C}/t \in dom(\mathbf{C})$
 - $link_3(\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{C}) = \mathbf{C}/t \in dom(\mathbf{A}_1)$
 - $link_3(\mathbf{A}_2, \mathbf{C}) = \mathbf{C}/t \in dom(\mathbf{A}_2)$
 - $link_3(\mathbf{A}_3, \mathbf{C}) = \mathbf{C}/t \in dom(\mathbf{A}_3)$
 - $link_4(\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{P}_1) = \mathbf{P}_1/t \in dom(\mathbf{A}_1) \land \mathbf{A}_1/t \in dom(\mathbf{A}_1)$
 - $link_4(\mathbf{A}_2, \mathbf{P}_2) = \mathbf{P}_2/t \in dom(\mathbf{A}_2) \land \mathbf{A}_2/t \in dom(\mathbf{A}_2)$
 - $link_4(\mathbf{A}_3, \mathbf{P}_3) = \mathbf{P}_3/t \in dom(\mathbf{A}_3) \land \mathbf{A}_3/t \in dom(\mathbf{A}_3)$

Filter Functions

• $f_1(a_2, a_1) = a_1/t \cup c/Rtc$

•
$$f_1(a_3, a_2) = a_2/t \cup c/Rtc$$

•
$$f_2(s, a_3) = a_3/t \cup c/Rtc$$

•
$$f_3(a_1, c) = p_1/R_{4,1}$$

•
$$f_3(a_2, c) = p_2/R_{4,2}$$

•
$$f_3(a_3, c) = p_3/R_{4,3}$$

•
$$f_4(a_1, p_1) = c/R_{1,1} \cup p_1/R_{2,2}$$

- $f_4(a_2, p_2) = c/R_{1,2} \cup p_2/R_{2,2}$
- $f_4(a_3, p_3) = c/R_{1,3} \cup p_3/R_{2,3}$

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Construction

Create \mathbf{A}_1 , \mathbf{A}_2 , \mathbf{A}_3 , \mathbf{S} , \mathbf{C} ; then

- **P**₁ has no relevant tickets
- P₂ has no relevant tickets
- **P**₃ has no relevant tickets
- \mathbf{A}_1 has \mathbf{P}_1/Rtc
- \mathbf{A}_2 has $\mathbf{P}_2/Rtc \cup \mathbf{A}_1/tc$
- A_3 has $P_3/Rtc \cup A_2/tc$
- S has $A_3/tc \cup C/Rtc$
- **C** has **C**/*R*₃

Construction

- Only $link_2(\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{A}_3)$ true \Rightarrow apply $f_2 \mathbf{A}_3$ has $\mathbf{P}_3/Rtc \cup \mathbf{A}_2/t \cup \mathbf{A}_3/t \cup \mathbf{C}/Rtc$
- Now $link_1(\mathbf{A}_3, \mathbf{A}_2)$ true \Rightarrow apply $f_1 \mathbf{A}_2$ has $\mathbf{P}_2/Rtc \cup \mathbf{A}_1/tc \cup \mathbf{A}_2/t \cup \mathbf{C}/Rtc$
- Now $link_1(\mathbf{A}_2, \mathbf{A}_1)$ true \Rightarrow apply $f_1 \mathbf{A}_1$ has $\mathbf{P}_2/Rtc \cup \mathbf{A}_1/tc \cup \mathbf{A}_1/t \cup \mathbf{C}/Rtc$
- Now all $link_3$ s true \Rightarrow apply f_3 - **C** has $\mathbf{C}/R_3 \cup \mathbf{P}_1/R_{4,1} \cup \mathbf{P}_2/R_{4,2} \cup \mathbf{P}_3/R_{4,3}$

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Finish Construction

- Now *link*₄ is true \Rightarrow apply f_4 - \mathbf{P}_1 has $\mathbf{C}/R_{1,1} \cup \mathbf{P}_1/R_{2,1}$ - \mathbf{P}_2 has $\mathbf{C}/R_{1,2} \cup \mathbf{P}_2/R_{2,2}$
 - \mathbf{P}_3 has $\mathbf{C}/R_{1,3} \cup \mathbf{P}_3/R_{2,3}$
- 3-parent joint create gives same rights to P₁, P₂, P₃, C
- If create of C fails, *link*₂ fails, so construction fails

Theorem


- The two-parent joint creation operation can implement an *n*-parent joint creation operation with a fixed number of additional types and rights, and augmentations to the link predicates and filter functions.
- **Proof**: by construction, as above
 - Difference is that the two systems need not start at the same initial state

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
Theorems

- Monotonic ESPM and the monotonic HRU model are equivalent.
- Safety question in ESPM also decidable if acyclic attenuating scheme
 - Proof similar to that for SPM





Example: 3-Parent Joint Creation

- Simulate with 2-parent
 - Nodes \mathbf{P}_1 , \mathbf{P}_2 , \mathbf{P}_3 parents
 - Create node **C** with type *c* with edges of type *e*
 - Add node A₁ of type a and edge from P₁ to A₁ of type e'



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Example

- Above 2-parent joint creation simulation in scheme *TWO*
- Equivalent to 3-parent joint creation scheme *THREE* in which P₁, P₂, P₃, C are of same type as in *TWO*, and edges from P₁, P₂, P₃ to C are of type *e*, and no types *a* and *e*' exist in *TWO*


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
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
Simulation


Scheme A simulates scheme B iff

- every state *B* can reach has a corresponding state in *A* that *A* can reach; and
- every state that *A* can reach either corresponds to a state *B* can reach, or has a successor state that corresponds to a state *B* can reach
 - The last means that A can have intermediate states not corresponding to states in B, like the intermediate ones in *TWO* in the simulation of *THREE*











Meaning • Scheme *B* cannot simulate scheme *A*, contradicting hypothesis ESPM more expressive than SPM - ESPM multiparent and monotonic SPM monotonic but single parent April 12, 2006 ECS 289M. Foundations of Computer Slide 37 and Information Security Typed Access Matrix Model • Like ACM, but with set of types T - All subjects, objects have types - Set of types for subjects TS • Protection state is (S, O, τ, A) $-\tau: O \rightarrow T$ specifies type of each object – If **X** subject, τ (**X**) in *T*S - If **X** object, τ (**X**) in T - TSApril 12, 2006 ECS 289M, Foundations of Computer Slide 38 and Information Security



- Precondition: $s \notin S$
- Primitive command: create subject s of type
 t
- Postconditions:
 - $-S' = S \cup \{s\}, O' = O \cup \{s\}$
 - $(\forall y \in O)[\tau'(y) = \tau(y)], \ \tau'(s) = t$
 - $(\forall y \in O')[a'[s, y] = \emptyset], (\forall x \in S')[a'[x, s] = \emptyset]$
 - $(\forall x \in S)(\forall y \in O)[a'[x, y] = a[x, y]]$

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Definitions

- MTAM Model: TAM model without delete, destroy
 - MTAM is Monotonic TAM
- $\alpha(x_1:t_1, ..., x_n:t_n)$ create command
 - t_i child type in α if any of create subject x_i of type t_i or create object x_i of type t_i occur in α
 - $-t_i$ parent type otherwise

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